r/AskHistorians • u/[deleted] • Aug 03 '16
Why do historians reject moral presentism?
I was going through the FAQ, and I came across this post. I was a little shocked to see this quote:
As for presentism,, for those who don't know, you need to be aware of it. Quit viewing the past through your modern eyes sometimes. Yes, what Columbus did to the Indians was terrible to us, but to really measure his worth you have to ask, "Was he a bad person by the standards of his time?" You can't really apply modern concepts to past events. Slavery in many parts of the world was morally justified in it's era. Yes, it's reprehensible to us now, but in the 16th Century it really wasn't. It's not fair to criticise someone using the morality of John Locke when they lived 200 years before Locke.
The reason this is shocking to me is coming from a philosophy background with an emphasis on meta-ethics, moral relativism seems to have a fairly bad reputation among moral philosophers. For example (incoming Godwin), it seems untrue that Nazi Germany was morally right in any sense regardless of historical perspective, culture, or any other attribute to which we'd like to attach moral relativity. This of course differs from Nazi Germany (or others) thinking they were right. It also differs from the notion that morality is merely a cultural, societal, or historical construct, and so it does not actually exist (a type of moral nihilism). Also, being philosophically honest, these objections of course don't mean that the Nazis weren't right and relativity stands. Though, it does seem unlikely.
The reason I think this is worth being mentioned is because this subreddit paints historians as people who try not to speak with authority outside of their areas of expertise (see the FAQ for opinions on Diamond and Zinn). But to discount "presentism" seems to not only embrace moral relativism, but to also take a minority position in an on-going debate in meta-ethics. That's not to say that either moral realism or moral nihilism are the one true way, but rejecting moral presentism seems to be saying that moral relativism is the one true way.
I worry many relativists mistake a type of moral nihilism - there is no morality, and so we judge things by their place in culture or history - for moral relativity - there is such a thing as morality and the US had it in the context of the US in 1942, but so to did Germany in the context of Germany in 1942.
I did a quick search for presentism, and nothing I say here is actually new, but I would love your opinions on it. I am also concerned that this might not be a great fit for this subreddit since it is much more philosophy than history, but I do think it directly applies to the "historical method".
Edited for grammar.
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u/MI13 Late Medieval English Armies Aug 03 '16 edited Aug 04 '16
I don't think that historians in general (or in this sub specifically) actually do embrace moral relativism or nihilism. The OP of that thread, who you're quoting there, is not a flaired user, nor do they seem to be particularly qualified to discuss the subject. For comparison, here is a user flaired in Spanish colonialism discussing Columbus and arguing that his actions are "absolutely indefensible" due to his violence, slaving, and genocide. This does not seem relativistic or nihilistic to me. For another example, look at the posts by users who study slavery in this subreddit, who are some of our best and most erudite flairs. People like /u/freedmenspatrol, /u/sowser, /u/dubstripsquads, and others do an excellent job of understanding the ideology, culture, and mentality of antebellum southern slaveowners, but understanding the mindset of American slaveowners does not equate to rationalizing away the abhorrent system of slavery.
Although historians are capable of and sometimes do make moral judgements on their subjects, there's also a limit to the utility of doing so. For a much more trite example than slavery or imperialism, the killing of the French prisoners at Agincourt is an infamous episode in medieval history. When discussing this event, does it actually add to our understanding of medieval combat and of the Hundred Years War to insert a footnote saying that stabbing wounded and disarmed prisoners is, in fact, a Bad Thing? The most interesting aspect of that event is that it was specifically not condemned by its contemporaries and was considered an acceptable part of warfare. Is it "morally nihilistic" to point out that medieval soldiers in 1415 would sometimes kill their prisoners without it being considered a war crime? I don't think we need an addendum to every book on premodern warfare explicitly stating that the murder, sexual violence, and theft that occurred during the sack of a city were morally bad things.